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Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) came to be known as the last Shah of Iran 
due to the success of an unprecedented religious revolution that dismantled the traditional 
Iranian monarchy.  The curious nature of the Iranian Revolution has drawn many scholars 
to explore its origins and the factors contributing to its unanticipated conclusion.  There 
exists, in the field, extensive analysis of the Shah’s accelerated modernization scheme 
and weakened administrative system,1 but little scrutiny of his cancer, hidden from the 
public for five years, as contributory to his fall.  Only a very few people were aware of 
the fact that the Shah was fighting a chronic illness as he was faced with a crisis in his 
country.  Certainly, serious diagnosis does not come without physical and psychological 
effects, which are likely to impact political decision-making in a national leader as they 
often manifest in behavioral changes in average patients.  It has been suggested that 
serious health conditions in heads of state can acutely disable a government from 
effectively confronting a crisis such as increasing opposition to the established system.2  
If analyzed in the context of the Shah’s illness, previously examined factors contributing 
to the growth and culmination of the opposition can provide even further insight into the 
unforeseen dissolution of the Iranian monarchy.  A medical and psychological analysis 
suggests the Shah’s cancer may very well have influenced his policy choice to accelerate 
his modernization program, which resulted in a strained society conducive to successful 
revolution.  
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On May 1, 1974, Dr. Georges Flandrin along with his mentor, renowned French 
hematologist Dr. Jean Bernard, arrived in Tehran unaware of the purpose of their visit 
and that it would be the first of many.  It wasn’t until the Minister of the Court, Asadollah 
Alam, had received them that they were told they had been called to assess the health of 
the Shah.  The Shah himself explained he had noticed a curve on his upper left abdominal 
a few months prior, which he had concluded to be the result of an enlarged spleen. Upon 
examination, the doctors determined the Shah’s self-diagnosis to be accurate.  They then 
analyzed blood and marrow samples in a makeshift laboratory that had been set up in an 
office near the bedroom and came to the consensus that the Shah was suffering from a 
form of chronic lymphocytic leukemia.  General Abdol Karim Ayadi, the Shah’s personal 
Iranian physician, was one of the few people informed of the illness from the beginning 
and it was he who convinced the French doctors that the words “leukemia” or “cancer” 
must not be used in any communication with the Shah.3  In order to satisfy this request, 
the Shah was officially diagnosed with Waldenström’s disease, referred to as a “blood 
complaint,” but in fact a mild form of lymphoma of leukemia carrying a more palatable 
title.4       
Accounts of the Shah’s illness tend to be somewhat contradictory, due to the fact 
that very few records exist prior to disclosure of his situation during his exile.  The most 
reliable information concerning the Shah’s affliction comes from letters written by 
Georges Flandrin to Dr. Bernard, although there is some evidence indicating that the 
Shah was aware of the severity of his illness before he became a patient of the French 
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hematologists.  The Shah annually visited a physician in Vienna, a Dr. Karl Fellinger, 
who, early in 1974, is reported to have discovered abnormalities in his patient’s spleen.  
The realization of potentially serious ill health reportedly made the Shah nervous, tense, 
and unable to sleep, to which Dr. Ayadi responded with regular doses of valium that were 
dispensed to him until the end of his life.5  Some accounts claim the Shah personally 
discovered his enlarged spleen in late 1973, while others claim it was in March of 1974; 
disparities can be attributed to a lack of documentation kept in time with developments 
due to the high priority placed on secrecy.  
Drs. Flandrin and Bernard had their second meeting with the Shah in September 
of 1974 at which point they prescribed 6mg of Chlorambucil and a monthly hemogram 
check.  Unfortunately, the French doctors did not regularly communicate with their 
Iranian counterparts and it wasn’t until their third visit in January of 1975 that they 
discovered the medication had been administered for no more than a week of treatment.  
At this point, the Chlorambucil was restarted and it was decided that Dr. Flandrin would 
make monthly trips to Tehran that continued until December 1978, the Shah’s last month 
in Iran.  Flandrin was dedicated to his patient and attempted to provide the best care 
possible under the circumstances, but throughout the course of his illness the Shah 
received medical care that was nowhere near the standard for any normal patient.  The 
doctor was constantly and, more importantly, initially prevented from thorough 
assessment of the Shah’s condition as the monarch and his inner circle refused any 
procedures that could not be concealed.6  After the Shah left Iran and while residing in 
Mexico, Dr. Benjamin Kean, an American, took over the Shah’s case.  He remembers 
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that, upon receiving the summary of the Shah’s five-year treatment, “Dr. Flandrin was 
almost apologetic about the care the Shah had received.  The Shah had never permitted 
Drs. Bernard and Flandrin to make a definitive diagnosis.  He had a deathly fear not of 
his illness but of public exposure.”7  Some experts claim the Shah may have been cured 
had he immediately received intensive treatment in 1974.8  Unfortunately, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi’s position as the Shah of Iran seriously diminished the quality of his 
medical care and whether or not it shortened his life will never be definitive ly known.    
The facts surrounding the Shah’s condition and his reaction to it may afford a new 
means of understanding the relationship between otherwise inexplicable policy choices.  
Jerrold Post has produced extensive work on the psychology of political behavior and, 
more specifically, the psychological effect of illness in heads of state in which he often 
employs the case of the Shah of Iran as an illustration of his theories.  Post asserts that 
people in positions of power feel the need to maintain an image of strength and control, 
which encourages the nondisclosure of a medical condition.  The importance placed on 
secrecy will often result in inadequate treatment, or none at all, and incomplete diagnostic 
assessments.9  Leaders confronted with serious illness tend to develop a sense of urgency 
to accomplish their goals, which can significantly affect political behavior.10  Post’s work 
provides a valid general framework with which to examine the unique circumstances of 
the Shah’s case in order to determine the extent to which his illness may have affected his 
political decision-making and the efficacy of the governing system overall.  In “The 
Captive King and his Captive Court,” Post and co-author Robert Robins offer four 
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categories of factors as tools for analysis: the nature of the illness, the leader’s reaction to 
his diagnosis, the structure of the political and social system, and the quality of medical 
care.11  It will be useful to examine the Shah’s cancer in this framework in order to 
understand its role in the revolution and his demise.    
The Shah’s illness was gradual in its onset, facilitating concealment for an 
extended period of time, and the disease itself only had physiological effects, allowing 
the Shah to participate in decision-making regarding treatment and disclosure, to continue 
to make political choices, and to make arrangements for his succession.12  Although the 
Shah’s leukemia did not have psychological symptoms, it is a rare case that one will not 
experience certain changes to his or her emotional state and cognition when affected with 
a physical disorder.  At the very least, the decreased energy characteristic of cancer 
patients would have had significant effects on the efficacy of the Shah’s governance.13  
The Shah was not completely disabled by his disease; he most likely experienced a loss 
of stamina, although it was attributed to the demands of office.  As early as 1973 he was 
observed to be tense, thin, and fatigued.14  It is probable that observed psychological 
changes were the results of prescribed medications.  For example, side effects of 
Chlorambucil, which the Shah took for nearly the entire course of his disease, include 
confusion and agitation.15   
As is natural with any person facing a serious illness, the Shah’s day-to-day 
behavior did not go unaffected by the psychological responses to a severe diagnosis.  
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Alam’s journal entry from the day after the second visit of the French doctors states that 
the Shah “seemed fretful and preoccupied, paying little attention to my report.”  The 
doctors had discovered his spleen once again enlarged and Alam realized, “it was 
precisely this that made him anxious.”16  He was observed to be irritable and dismissive 
at times.  When Henry Kissinger, then American Secretary of State, announced he would 
not be visiting Iran in 1974, the Shah told Alam, “to hell with Kissinger.  Pay him no 
attention and tell Ardeshir Zehedi that he’s to avoid offering any sort of invitation.”17  
Events such as this one indicate the Shah experienced mood fluctuations that aligned with 
the onset of his illness and the introduction of his cancer medications.  Considering the 
fact that the Shah uncharacteristically dismissed his closest ally on a whim, it seems clear 
that these changes affected his political behavior.  Domestic policy felt the effects of 
somewhat anxious behavior; government officials report the Shah hurrying along their 
projects even when they did not have the full resources to be effective.  When the 
president of Aryamehr University met with the Shah to make a major budgetary request 
he expected the Shah would refuse him outright, but instead the Shah replied, “you may 
have it all…but spend it as quickly as you can.”18  The Shah’s policy decisions 
subsequent to his diagnosis reflected personality changes that could be easily attributed to 
the circumstances of his illness.   
The extent to which the Shah was aware of the nature and severity of his illness is 
still debated.  Specific information, most importantly his true diagnosis, was kept from 
him as was in line with customary practices of the court and, to a certain extent, Islamic 
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culture.  Prime Minister Hoveyda once explained, “His Majesty is our captain, we must 
not undermine his resolve by bombarding him with bad news.”19  Although those 
surrounding the Shah attempted to maintain as positive an atmosphere as possible, his 
wife posits that he was much more aware of his condition than he let on.  In retrospect, 
she can identify several instances that very well may have indicated he was aware of his 
limited time.  She recalls a remark he made in a meeting in the winter of 1975 to the 
French president:  
My Problem is I haven’t enough time.  I won’t be remaining in power for 
long.  I intend leaving in seven or eight years…I would prefer to leave 
earlier, but my son is still too young.  I will wait until he is ready, but I 
want the essentials to be in place before he takes over.  He will have a lot 
of difficulties in the beginning.  It’s up to me to bring about the 
transformation of Iran.  I am determined to do it.20  
 
Although it is possible the Shah may have been communicating a plan to abdicate simply 
due to his age, it is unlikely that it was the only motivating factor for such a decision.  
Early in his rule, the Shah openly expressed extensive goals for the development of Iran 
that would require several decades to be fully realized.  Leaving power by 1982 would 
cut his timeline short and in no way allow him to see his plans through to completion.  
His expressed determination to “transform” Iran, presumably meaning to complete his 
previously stated goals, before relinquishing the throne to his son demonstrates a sense of 
urgency.  In this context, it is not unreasonable to suggest that such a statement may have 
been motivated by an awareness that his ill health would soon catch up with him.  
 Understanding the extent to which the Shah was aware of the nature of his illness 
is essential to analyzing his psychological response.  Unfortunately, gaining an accurate 
picture can be quite difficult in light of Iranian cultural practices surrounding illness and 
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medical care.  The work of Juliene G. Lipson and Afaf I. Meleis on the “Issues in Health 
Care of Middle Eastern Patients” suggests that the court practice of concealing bad news 
from the Shah may have stemmed from a greater cultural element common to Middle 
Eastern societies, which governs hope and respect for one’s dignity.  The authors observe 
that among the families of Middle Eastern patients it is generally regarded as imprudent 
to fully divulge information in times of crisis and it is for this reason that patients are not 
completely informed in the case of serious illness.  Refusal to openly accept terminal 
diagnosis is common to most Islamic cultures due to the belief that only God may truly 
know if a disease will prove to be fatal; therefore hope must never be abandoned because 
to accept death would be to relinquish the assistance of God.  It is a regular practice for 
family members to intercept communication concerning grave illness for fear that the 
patient will give up once informed of its terminal nature.  It may be that some nonverbal 
correspondence occurs, but death is not to be spoken of as it is thought to ensure one’s 
fate.21  In the context of the culture surrounding health care, it is understandable that the 
Shah was not fully informed of his condition and that knowledge of it was kept to a very 
small circle.  Verbal communication was limited, but it is not unlikely that the Shah 
educated himself and personally discovered the true nature of his diagnosis, as he 
certainly did not lack the resources.  If this were the case, cultural practices suggest he 
never would have communicated his discovery.   
The decision to conceal the state of the Shah’s health from the Iranian public may 
be attributed to political motivations.  Historically in Iran, a smooth succession was never 
guaranteed and any sign of weakness in a ruler would put not only himself, but the 
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dynasty as a whole, at the risk of overthrow.  If a regime was perceived as incapable of 
maintaining stability of the state it was no longer seen as legitimate.22   Of course, all 
regimes have a significant interest in sustaining an image of strength so that their 
positions of power is not threatened, but this has proven to be particularly important 
among Iranian monarchs in light of the country’s historical instability and concept of 
legitimate state power.  Such patterns are exemplified in the case of the assassination of 
Naser ad-Din Shah in 1896.  Although he was shot and died immediately, Naser ad-Din’s 
body was quickly concealed and positioned in a carriage with an advisor to give the 
appearance that nothing was wrong.  Concealing his death was seen as necessary in order 
to prevent rebellions long enough to secure his successor’s place.23  It is likely 
Mohammad Reza Shah and his inner circle determined it was in their best interest to hide 
his cancer from the public because of the traditional nature of Iranian society to reject 
weakness and use it as an opportunity for rebellion.  If the Shah did not portray strength it 
is quite possible he could not have ensured his son’s right to succeed him.  In his final 
published work, Answer to History, the Shah claims his illness was hidden in the best 
interest of the public, but within the framework devised by Post and Robins, claims such 
as this are purely rationalizations, the primary motivation being the need to maintain 
power.24  This psychological interpretation is in line with historical pressure to avoid the 
perception of weakness in Iranian society.  Because open acknowledgement was not 
acceptable, written accounts of the Shah’s illness can be distorted by selective disclosure, 
genuine lack of knowledge, and retrospective interpretations of ambiguous events.     
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 At the very least, the Shah was aware of the fact that he was ill and it is highly 
plausible that he came to understand the gravity of his condition absent of any direct 
communication.  The psychological theory of Post and Robins suggests that the Shah 
entered a race against time with the onset of his illness and there is extensive evidence to 
suggest that his political behavior indeed took on an air of urgency.  On November 22, 
1973, Alam writes in his diary that the Shah delivered a speech to his top government 
officials that resembled a political last will and testament.  In this address the Shah 
acknowledged his mortality, clarified the nature of his succession, expressed his adamant 
desire for the success of his “White Revolution,” and shared hope that he might witness it 
bring about the “Great Civilization.”  This breed of communication was completely 
unprecedented and unexpected.  Alam describes the room as absolutely silent when the 
Shah concluded, pointing out that “everyone [was] too electrified to utter a sound.”25  
This was a definite break in behavior and demonstrates a need to ensure the continuation 
of the Shah’s plans for his country in the case of his death, something entirely 
unanticipated especially at such a relatively young age.  The queen recounts in her 
memoir that in the month following the fiftieth anniversary of the dynasty in 1976 the 
Shah began to instruct her, along with their eldest son, in the affairs of the country several 
times a week.26  It was well understood that the Shah’s oldest son Reza would succeed 
him, but he would not reach legal age until the end of 1980.  The fact that in 1973 the 
Shah named his wife as his temporary successor27 and in 1976 included her in political 
lessons suggests that he saw his death before his son could succeed or effectively rule as 
a serious possibility.    
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In April of 1974, Asadollah Alam remarked on the Shah’s successes to which the 
Shah surprisingly commented, “I have so many more aspirations.  To be first in the 
Middle East is not enough.  We must raise ourselves to the level of a great world power.  
Such a goal is by no means attainable.”28  It seems the Shah had begun to foresee his 
imminent death and to consider the serious possibility that he would not have sufficient 
time to attain all that he hoped.  This communication certainly did not mark the end of the 
Shah’s effort to foster the nation he envisioned; in fact his behavior suggests that he 
continued to do as much as possible to see his goals realized in his shortened amount of 
time.  The Shah’s drive to place Iran among the great nations can be observed in the 
treatment of his nuclear program, which he came to consider a symbol of power and 
progress.29  He established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1973.  The 
organization’s employees became some of the highest paid in the government and by 
1976 it was Iran’s second largest economic institution, after the National Iranian Oil 
Company, with a budget of $1.3 billion.  For the sake of prudency, the Shah actively 
denied any intent to develop a nuclear bomb, but Alam suggested in his diary that the 
Shah really did hope to attain it.30  This can perhaps be attributed to the Shah’s desire to 
join the group of great nations although it suggests somewhat skewed priorities.  It seems 
the bomb would be a kind of shortcut, something achievable in a relatively short amount 
of time with the right resources, to making Iran not only a prominent power in the Middle 
East, but one of the dominant powers of the world.  The Shah invested so much in a 
program that had little effect on the welfare of his people, but instead might ensure he 
                                                 
28
 Alam, 360.  
29
 Abbas Milani, “The Shah’s Atomic Dreams.” Foreign Policy (December, 2010): 3. 
30
 Milani, “The Shah’s Atomic Dreams,” 4.  
 13 
would be remembered by history as the man that gave Iran the ability to really compete 
on the world stage.  
A leader’s role in the political system as well as his personal reaction to his illness 
are important in identifying psychological responses that manifest in political actions.  
The Shah retained the full decision-making power of his government; his administration 
was centralized and entirely reliant on his judgment.31  Post and Robins claim it is 
political systems like that of monarchical Iran, characterized by high dependence on a 
central figure, which are most prone to collapse in the event of debilitated leadership.  
The system’s extreme centralization made it a delicate one that could function effectively 
only if all the actors could maintain balance in their various branches.  Any changes in 
government officials or duties could make the administration immediately unstable.  
Khosrow Fatemi in his article “Leadership by Distrust,” posits that the reorganization of 
the government in late 1977 created a systemic imbalance that rendered it unable to 
properly respond to the coinciding challenges to its power.  In August the Shah named a 
new Prime Minister and relinquished much of his power in economic affairs, in which he 
had previously been directly involved.  A third of the government’s primary officials 
were changed as well, seriously affecting the oil, economic, foreign, and domestic affairs 
departments.  During the reorganization, the Shah gave much more authority to his 
officials, decreasing reliance on himself; a system to which his bureaucrats were entirely 
unaccustomed.  Fatemi suggest they were unable to make the adjustment and could not 
effectively execute their duties.32  The Shah may have been compensating for his 
anticipated death and hoping to create an administration that might be self-sufficient, 
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albeit loyal, for a limited amount of time during a transition period before his son 
succeeded him.  Unfortunately, he destabilized his administration at the worst possible 
time.  The weakened system gave the opposition the window of opportunity that was 
necessary to successfully overthrow the monarchy.    
 The Shah had great plans of modernization for Iran that culminated in the “White 
Revolution,” a policy scheme he implemented in 1963.  In his published works the Shah 
displays an intense love for his country and a desire to see Iran rise to its fullest potential 
in the modern world.  In his autobiography he describes his rationalization for his 
bloodless revolution from above:  
If our nation wished to remain in the circle of dynamic, progressive and 
free nations of the world, it had no alternative but to completely alter the 
archaic order of society, and to structure its future on a new order 
compatible with the vision and needs of the day.  This required a deep and 
fundamental revolution which would put an end to injustice, tyranny, 
exploitation, and reactionary forces which impeded progress.33  
 
The program was presented as a plan to improve the lives of the Iranian people and to 
build a solid foundation upon which Iran could flourish in the modern world, but some 
scholars suggest that the centralized promotion of revolutionary nationalism was a 
calculated scheme to legitimize and institutionalize the Pahlavi dynasty.34   Motivations 
aside, the “White Revolution” was certainly not a revolution in the normal sense; it was 
intended to be a slow, strategic development over several decades.  The Shah intended his 
son to succeed him only once he had created the ideal environment.  The construction of 
the “White Revolution” had assumed that the Shah would be capable of overseeing its 
development long enough for its goals to be realized, but the Shah’s diagnosis indicated it 
was no longer likely.  In response, the Shah sped up the progress of the program in the 
                                                 
33
 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), 101.  
34
 Ansari, 2-3.  
 15 
hope that he might achieve his goals before his death.35  This change is demonstrated by 
the fact that the first twelve points of the program were implemented between 1963 and 
1967, prior to the discovery of the Shah’s illness, and the last seven points were all 
implemented in the last four months of 1975, the year following his diagnosis.36  In the 
words of Post, “the Shah superimposed his personal timetable on the nation’s timetable, 
and in doing so had destabilized Iran” and created an environment in which his opponents 
could instill revolution.37   
 The rapid modernization of Iran played an important role in creating 
revolutionary sentiment.  Modernization in the context of the Shah’s efforts in Iran has 
nearly become synonymous with Westernization.  The overbearing presence of the West 
in modern Iranian history made it impossible for the nation to modernize without 
reflecting key aspects of the modern Western world even if unintentional, although the 
Shah, holding a degree of respect for the dominant Western nations, probably intended to 
emulate the West to a certain extent.  It can be argued that Westernization took 
precedence over traditional Iranian culture and disoriented the people; the public 
experienced a loss of identity as standards of living rapidly rose and people struggled to 
conform to the modern ideals imposed by the Shah.  In this light, opposition to the Shah 
can be seen as a response to Westernization in an attempt to regain cultural integrity and 
national identity.38  Interestingly, the Shah understood the consequences of development 
that occurred too quickly.  He was often urged by his American allies to modernize more 
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rapidly.  In response to this kind of pressure he reportedly told an American diplomat in 
1958, “I can start a revolution for you but you won’t like the end result.”39  The Shah lost 
sight of this in the final years of his reign, compromising his understanding of the 
possibly disastrous outcomes with his desire to complete his vision for his Iran while he 
was in a position to do so.  
 Several Iranian intellectual reformists wrote of the infatuation with the West and 
its poisonous effect on the native culture during the prerevolutionary period.   In his 
work, “The ‘Westoxication’ of Iran,” Brad Hanson analyzes the works of three prominent 
reformists providing distinct perspectives that may be loosely interpreted as 
representative of the major oppositional positions that developed in Iran during the 
modernization period.  Samad Behrangi (1939-1968) denounced the middle class infected 
by Western influence that began to emerge in the 1960s.  He claimed their only interest 
was in material comfort and they spent their time in idleness and diversion, resulting in 
superficial and conservative men.40  He refers to the effects of Westernization on the 
Iranian people as a kind of cultural disease that must be remedied to establish social 
equality and a distinct Iranian culture.  Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) also saw the 
influence of Western material culture in Iran and largely attributed it to economic 
dependency on the West.  He did not want Iran to allow itself to be dominated by 
Western culture and suggested that a lessening of economic relations and development of 
independent industry as a possible solution.  Ali Shariati (1933-1977) represented the 
religious ideology that eventually drove the Islamic revolution against the Shah.  He 
wrote of the effects on the Iranian people of the Western imperialist system that had 
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“converted us into empty pots which accommodate whatever is poured inside them.”41  
He claimed the solution to “westoxication” was a revitalization of the unique Iranian 
Shiism.  The perspectives of these men are a sample of the sentiments existing among the 
people of Iran with respect to the Westernization that was inherent in the Shah’s 
modernization.  Although there existed countless opinions as to the proper response to the 
problem, a large portion of the public felt Western materialism was invading Iran.  
Traditional culture was at stake and the country was at risk of losing its national identity 
to Western conformity. 
The Shah’s liberalization program beginning in 1976 was a reflection of his 
efforts to legitimize and institutionalize his dynasty.  The legitimacy of the Pahlavi 
dynasty had always been in question due to the circumstances of its rise to power; the 
Shah’s father, Reza Shah, had established the dynasty by deposing the last Qajar ruler, 
the member of a family that had controlled Iran for over a hundred years.42  Pressure 
from newly elected United States President Jimmy Carter contributed to acceleration of 
the liberalization scheme, but did not serve as the impetus.43  In order to liberalize his 
country, the Shah began to tolerate dissidents, release political prisoners, promise free 
elections, and lift restrictions on the press.  Unfortunately, these changes came too late to 
satisfy the rising tide of discontent among the public. The Shah believed he could ensure 
his son’s right to the throne by making concessions to his opposition in the hope that it 
would secure their appreciation of the crown, but the government underestimated the 
public discontent.  It was too late when the Shah’s administration realized the 
revolutionary issues could not be easily remedied.  Amir Abbas Hoveida, Minister of the 
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Court in 1978, said of the public disturbances, “these are the inevitable problems of a 
rapidly developing economy. If we had been able to slow down our growth, these weak 
points would have been less visible.  But we were condemned to forge ahead faster and 
faster.”44  The Shah’s liberalization was begun within a weakened economic system and, 
to much of his opposition, his concessions seemed a weak attempt to downplay the 
failures of his economic development.  The Shah made the mistake of simplifying the 
problem, attributing all of the opposition to the religious leaders when, in fact, discontent 
had been developing for various reasons across a broader spectrum of interest groups.  
The government under the Shah was unable to effectively respond to the opposition 
movement, revolutionary demonstrations escalated beyond control, and on January 16, 
1979, the Shah left Iran.   
 Analysis of the Shah’s political behavior under a psychological framework 
suggests that certain decisions and events in the last years of the monarchy may have 
been more related to the reality of his terminal illness than has been previously 
considered.  In the early years of his regime the Shah had developed an elaborate plan for 
the development of Iran that would bring that nation on par with the dominant nations of 
the world and secure his place in history as the monarch responsible for Iran’s success.  
He was also determined to ensure the continuation of his dynasty and solidify the place of 
the monarchy in the Iranian political system.  From the beginning, the Shah was well 
aware of the fact that his plans would require incremental changes and patient 
development.  When he became conscious of the severity of his illness he had to face the 
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possibility that he would not have sufficient time to see his dreams come to fruition.  
Psychological interpretation of accounts of the Shah from 1973 onward reveal behavioral 
and communicated signs of disappointment with his lack of time due to his diagnosis.  
Through the perspective of the framework provided by Post and Robins for the analysis 
of terminally ill heads of state, the Shah’s political decisions made after he became ill can 
be understood as attempts to do what was necessary, without regard to the possibly 
negative effects of accelerated programs, to achieve as much as possible in the time that 
he had left.  The Shah significantly added to the facets of his “White Revolution,” 
reorganized his administrative system, and attempted to establish legitimacy and secure 
the allegiance of the masses through his dramatic liberalization program all in a very 
short period of time.  Rapid Westernization destabilized Iranian society and contributed 
to growing opposition to the Shah and his policies to which the temporarily weakened 
government was unable to respond effectively.  It can be reasonably suggested that the 
Shah’s struggle with cancer was a significant factor in his fall from power and it should 
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